In the modern period, concepts and movements of *tajdid* take many different forms. Many movements have their intellectual origins in the teachings of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), who joined with a chieftain in central Arabia, Muhammad ibn Saud (d. 1765), to create a political system and movement of puritanical renewal. In its strictness and uncompromising approach to what it defined as innovations, the Wahhabi movement came to be seen as the prototypical militant style of Islamic renewal. By the late twentieth century, even militant movements that had no direct connections with the actual Wahhabi tradition came to be called “Wahhabi.”

Modern movements that emphasized the importance of the intellectual dimensions of renewal through *ijtihad* became important by the late nineteenth century. A leading personality in this was the Egyptian scholar Muhammad ‘Abdul (d. 1905), who served as Grand Mufti of Egypt. ‘Abdul emphasized the compatibility of reason and revelation in Islam. *Al-Manar*, the journal reflecting his teachings, was read by intellectuals throughout the Muslim world at the beginning of the twentieth century. Other conscious movements of intellectual renewal developed in the Russian Empire under Isma’il Gasprinskii, in India with Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, and elsewhere.

Throughout the twentieth century, the movements of rationalist renewal continued. However, they were overshadowed by Muslim movements advocating broader programs of social and political Islamization. The Muslim Brotherhood, established in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna in 1928, and the Jama’at-e Islami, established in South Asia by Abu I-’Ala’ Maududi (d. 1979) in 1941, became the most visible examples of modern-style renewal movements. These movements presented programs for creating Islamic states and societies in the modern world. Although for a time they were overshadowed by secular nationalist and radical leftist movements, by the 1980s the movements of Islamic resurgence were the most visible opposition movements in many countries, and often they set the agenda for the Islamization of political discourse throughout the Muslim world. Intellectuals within these movements, like Hasan al-Turabi, who led the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan for most of the final third of the twentieth century, wrote about the necessity for *tajdid* in rethinking all of the fundamentals of political, social, and legal structures in the Muslim world.

By the late twentieth century, many of the more visible militant Muslim groups, like al-Qa’ida, were concentrating on issues of power and jihad rather than *ijtihad*. The broad tradition of renewal in Islam continued in new forms, among the militants and also among scholars who continued the process of reexamining the sources in order to present ways of having renewed Islamic life in the contemporary world.

See also *Ijtihad; Reform: Arab Middle East and North Africa; Reform: South Asia; Taqlid.*

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**TALIBAN**

The word *taliban* derives from the Persian plural form of the Arabic word *talib*, meaning “seeker” or “student.” As a general term, *taliban*, or its Arabic equivalents *tullab* or *talaba*, alludes to students from madrasas (religious schools) dedicated to theological studies of Islam. After 1994, however, Da Afghanistan da Talibano Islami Tahrik (The Afghan Islamic Movement of Taliban), or “Taliban,” was known internationally as the name chosen by a *mujahidin* splinter group that eventually dominated the civil war in Afghanistan.

The rise of the Taliban as a military force is debated. Their supporters maintained that the movement surfaced in Kandahar to enforce public safety and order in reaction to the looting and harassment of the local population by other *mujahidin* groups. Their opponents viewed the Taliban as a creation of Pakistan’s Inter services Intelligence (ISI) in order to gain indirect control of Afghanistan and unhindered access to Central Asia.

In any case, the Taliban, with direct Pakistani military and diplomatic support and financial backing from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), emerged as the dominant military force that gradually came to rule about 85 percent of Afghanistan by 1999 (the remainder of the country was controlled by an anti-Taliban alliance under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Mas’ud). Comprised of former *mujahidin* belonging mostly to the Pashtun ethnic majority, the group first emerged in Kandahar in 1994. The original leaders and members claimed to be students from religious schools run by Pakistan’s Jam’iyat-e ‘Ulama-e Islam (JUI).

The Taliban gained international notice on 3 November 1994, when the group freed a convoy of Pakistani trucks commandeered by a local Afghan *mujahidin* group. Two days later, the Taliban captured Kandahar, and in September 1995, the western city of Herat. The Taliban seized the capital, Kabul, on 27 September 1996, ousting the ruling *mujahidin* government of President Burhan al-Din Rabbani.

Initially, the Taliban claimed that its goal was to rid the country from factionalism and the rule of warlords. However, on 3 April 1996, Mulla Muhammad ‘Omar Mujahid proclaimed himself Emir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful), thus becoming the Emir (ruler) of Afghanistan. Taking
A young girl peers out among a group of Afghan women wearing the Burqa covering at a Red Cross distribution center in Kabul in 1996, when the ruling Taliban forced women to cover themselves completely in public, and banned women from schools and workplaces. AP/Wide World Photos

advantage of inter-Uzbek rivalries in northern Afghanistan, in May 1997, the Taliban captured Mazar-i-Sharif, the last significant Afghan city not under its control. This victory brought the Taliban recognition from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. Although defeated in a subsequent battle, with heavy losses to their ranks (including some 250 Pakistani casualties), the Taliban recaptured Mazar-i-Sharif and then seized the Hazarah stronghold of Bamiyan in 1998 and 1999. This consolidation of power changed the internal structure of the Taliban movement from loose pockets of fighters led by a consultative council in which Mulla ‘Omar was primus inter pares, into an theocratic regime increasingly ruled with secrecy and terror as a means of control, with no leader accessible to the people. As rulers, the Taliban sought the creation of what the movement believed to be pure Islamic rule according to the shari’ā (Islamic law).

From its appearance on the Afghan political scene until its capture of Kabul, the Taliban were viewed by some sectors of the Afghan population as a means of restoring order. This view was also shared by certain foreign powers, including the United States, which tacitly welcomed the Taliban capture of Kabul. However, while securing the territories under its control, the Taliban proved to be yet another destabilizing group of warriors whose methods included ethnically targeted mass murder of unarmed civilians (in the northern and central parts of Afghanistan) as well as the total blockade of food supplies (to the Bamiyan region). What triggered international condemnation of the Taliban, though, was their maltreatment of women, who were banned from attending schools, holding jobs, venturing outside of their homes unless accompanied by a male relative, and being treated by male physicians. The Taliban also placed restrictions on foreign female aid workers helping Afghan women.

Signs of the Taliban’s eventual international isolation began to show in 1998. With pressure from women’s rights groups, the absence of international investment, and the Taliban’s double-dealings with rival pipeline projects, the U.S. oil company Unocal pulled out of a major business deal that would have facilitated the construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan, a project planned by Unocal and a Saudi company, Delta Oil.

In August 1998, in retaliation for the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa by affiliates of Usama bin Ladin and the Taliban’s refusal to surrender him, the United States launched cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist camps in Afghanistan and spearheaded an international effort to isolate the Taliban through unilateral and U.N. sanctions.

In addition, the Taliban’s drug production and trafficking activities brought international scorn. In 2001 the United Nations acknowledged Taliban efforts to reduce the production of narcotics, the first such recognition since their assumption of power in 1994. However, these efforts did not gain the movement much international sympathy, as its radicalization intensified. In March 2001, Mulla ‘Omar ordered the destruction of all idols in the country, including two 1,500-year-old colossal Buddha statues in Bamiyan. Two months later, in a decree that brought international outrage, the Taliban ordered all non-Muslim Afghans to wear distinctive yellow patches.

The policies of the Taliban affecting women and religious minorities, its destruction of ancient Buddha statues, and the banning of music, television, photography, and traditional Afghan games such as kite flying were carried out under an innovative form of the shari’ā, combining Pashtun tribal codes and a radical form of Islamic teaching propagated by some of the graduates of the Dar al-‘Ulam (House of Sciences) madrasa in Deoband, India, who later became members of JIU and other radical Islamic movements in Pakistan. The presence of radical Arabs encamped in Afghanistan led by Usama bin Ladin also galvanized this development. While some Taliban members genuinely believed their rule was based in Islam, others appeared to use Islam as a justification for absolute “divine” power. The policies of the Taliban have given birth to the term “Talibanization,” referring to this new form of radical Islam.

The 11 September 2001 suicide bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., were immediately attributed to Usama bin
Ladin. Because the group of Arab and other Muslim fighters he headed, known as al-Qa’ida, had operated in Afghanistan with the knowledge and protection of the Taliban government, a U.S.-led war of retaliation led to the destruction of the Taliban government and the routing of al-Qa’ida forces from Afghanistan. In early December 2001, the leaders of both the Taliban and al-Qa’ida escaped and fled into the mountains of eastern Afghanistan or into Pakistan.

As of early Spring 2003, the Taliban had begun regrouping and instigating frequent, low-level attacks against Afghan and U.S.-led anti-terror coalition forces in the south and southeastern regions of Afghanistan, along the border with Pakistan. Many Taliban members were believed to be sheltered in the southwestern region of Pakistan and assisted by sympathetic individuals and groups there. The whereabouts of top Taliban leaders, including Mulla ‘Omar, remained unknown. However propaganda distributed by the group in Afghanistan claimed that he continued to lead the Taliban.

See also Mojahidin; Qa’ida, al-; Political Islam.

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TANZIMAT

The Tanzimat (meaning reorganization, reordering) was a reform period in the Ottoman Empire lasting from 1839 to 1871. Its aims were modernization, centralization, increasing revenue, and forestalling fragmentation and conquest. Its main agents were the influential grand wazirs Mustafa Resit Pasa (1800–1858) and his protégés, Fuat (1815–1869) and ‘Ali (1815–1871). Sultan Mahmud II’s 1826 destruction of the old janissary military corps, which resisted change and deposed those who advocated change, and the introduction of Western-language education paved the way for these reforms.

The 1839 Imperial Rescript (Hatt-i Serif) of Gülhane guaranteed security and equal justice to all subjects, regardless of religion. He also proposed reforms in taxation and military conscription and created a lawmaking body. A new class of modern-educated men staffed a reorganized bureaucracy and military, and standardized provincial government and taxes. The Crimean War (1853–1856) interrupted progress, but at its end a new reform rescript (Hatt-i Hümayun, 1856) reiterated and expanded earlier reforms. Councils of State, Justice, Education, and Reform were established at various points in time, charged with the task of overseeing the process. Provincial councils were also established, including representatives of different religious and social groups.

Tax reforms were insufficient to prevent bankruptcy (1876), but communications and education gradually improved, and a new lawcode (Mecelle) was prepared, which codified Islamic law in the Western style. Reforms were stringently applied, leading to complaints of tyranny. The Young Ottomans proposed a constitutional government, but were suppressed by the absolute monarchy of ‘Abd al-Hamid II. Technical modernization continued, but political liberalization was postponed until the twentieth century.

See also Empires: Ottoman; Modernization, Political: Administrative, Military, and Judicial Reform; Young Turks.

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TAQIYYA

Often translated as “dissimulation,” the word taqiyya is etymologically linked to piety and devotion. In Twelver Shi’ite thought it has come to refer to the tactic employed by the imams (and recommended to the Shi’ites) of hiding one’s beliefs when faced with oppression. Normally, a Muslim is expected to declare his belief, so to deny it is a grave sin (kabira). However, according to tradition, the Shi’ite imams were faced with oppression from the Sunni majority, and in order to preserve the well-being of both their followers and themselves, they dissimulated. Outwardly they would conform to Sunni belief and practice; inwardly they would remain Shi’ite. When the Abbasid caliph al-Mansur embarked on a campaign against the supporters of the sixth imam, Ja’far, the imam is said to have encouraged the Shi’a to dissimulate in order to save themselves. The doctrine was based upon a certain interpretation of the Qur’anic verse 16:106, where the wrath of God is said to await the apostate “except those who are compelled while their hearts are firm in faith.” This exceptive clause is interpreted in Shi’ite Qur’anic commentaries as referring to “those who are forced to practice taqiyya.”

Taqiyya, within the Shi’ite tradition, can be seen as a balance to shabada—the willingness to expose oneself to